Indiana Law Journal
Volume 26

Issue 4

Article 11

Summer 1951

Democracy in a World of Tensions: A Symposium prepared by
UNESCO, edited by Richard McKeon
Robert S. Brumbaugh
Indiana University - Bloomington

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation
Brumbaugh, Robert S. (1951) "Democracy in a World of Tensions: A Symposium prepared by UNESCO,
edited by Richard McKeon," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 26 : Iss. 4 , Article 11.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol26/iss4/11

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open
access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
DEMOCRACY IN A WORLD OF TENSIONS:

A SYMPOSIUm PREPARED BY

UNESCO. Edited by Richard McKeon,* with the assistance of Stein
Rokkan.** Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. xviii,
540. $4.50.
This volume is a selection from the replies of thirty-four experts in
philosophy and political theory to a set of questions concerning the meaning,
usage, and logical implications of the word "democracy." In a world where
nearly everyone agrees that "democracy" is a good thing,1 such a discussion
as this may alleviate some of the tensions resulting from the fact that not
everyone has the same definition of what "democracy" is, so that there are
frequent surprises and recriminations when an agreement of certain verbal
statements fails to produce expected agreement as to practical application.
Throughout the book, the selection and nature of the material and the
summaries by United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization experts and committees appearing at the end2 accomplish what a good
philosophic work should accomplish-they prevent the reader from approaching the discussion as a mere spectator; unavoidably, he soon finds himself a
partner in the inquiry. Students of Professor McKeon will not be surprised
at this result of his editorial enterprise.
This study is a part of a series of UNESCO projects, among which may
be included a second symposium of expert opinion in response to questions
intended to carry forward the present discussion of "democracy." In this
review, attention is called to three considerations which most of the contributors have not emphasized in this first set of responses, and which should be
treated explicitly in a second round of discussion. The necessity of UNESCO
making "democracy" the theme for a second study follows directly from the
undeniable desirability of having these factors specifically considered.
In the first place, a greater effort should be exerted to obtain from each
author a clear statement of the meaning he attaches to "democracy." "Clear"
here is thought of in the traditional sense in which a concept is called "clear"
when all of its constitutive parts have been explicitly stated, and when every
latent assumption appears as an explicit statement. In the present case, there
is a strong tendency toward simplifying premises which detract from clarity.
* Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy and Greek, University of Chicago;
member, United States National Committee on UNESCO.
** Member, United States National Committee on UNESCO.
1. This fact is certainly one of the most important discoveries of the symposium; its
significance is discussed by the Editor in his Introduction.

2. Appendix II: "Statement of the Members of the Committee Concerning the Importance of the Problem," pp. 522-526; Appendix III: "Report of the Committee on the
PhilosophicalAnalysis of Fundamental Concepts," pp. 532-537. There is also a somewhat
longer analysis in the "Analytical Survey of Agreements and Disagreements," by Arne

Naess and Stein Rokkan, pp. 447-513.
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The sharpest differences appear between two groups of contributions
which we may roughly characterize as those defining democracy as essentially
economic, and those defining it as essentially political. There is an artificiality
to the sharpness of these differences, because each group has neglected to
state some of the premises relevant to its position. Each writer is in fact
thinking about "democracy" as a property of a functioning society; for purposes of sharp definition, most tend to isolate an essential property without
which no society could be what they mean by "democratic." But in applying
and using such definitions, the essential property is once more thought of as
present in a concrete society, and other properties are tacitly added on. For
example, if the essential feature of democracies is a certain political structure,
then a democratic society is one in which such a structure exists and functions. But such a democratic society is possible only when certain attitudes,
education, and economic practices are present. These further properties are
really implicit in the definition, which provides that a society is "democratic"
only when the given essential political structure does persist and function.
But it is not adequate analysis to leave them unspecified in discussing the definition; these further conditions require separate and explicit statement. Particularly if a thinker forms his idea of what a "society" is from his own immediate experience, he is likely to overlook the fact that such characteristics
as high literacy are not inevitably properties of all communities, and he should
not use such latent premises without including them as explicit addenda to
his definition.
The Marxist contributors frequently point out that definitions in terms
of political institutions are "purely formal," and that one could build hypothetical societies where those institutions were present, but "democracy" in
a political sense was not. This of course overlooks the fact that the political
definitions assume not only that these institutions exist, but that they continue
and function. But the contention does point out that more explicit statement
is needed of just what properties we assume in postulating such a preservation
and functioning. For the most part, there is at least an equal lack of full ana-,
lysis in the contributions defending "economic" definitions of democracy.3'
Especially when the reader is told that in a society meeting certain economic
conditions, certain political conditions "must" or "must not" be the case, he is
justified in wishing for a fuller statement of the latent premises supporting
such asserted necessity.
The difficulty of becoming aware of and stating all of one's implicit as3. The fact that spokesmen for the Marxist position are drawn from "Western"
democracies may be unavoidable, but it probably explains the general lack of concrete positive illustrations of their positions; they do much better in concrete illustration of their
criticisms. One of the best statements of actual Soviet institutions and their concrete
functioning is given by Lord Lindsay of Birker in an Essay originally part of his Powell
Lectures at Indiana University. Pp. 172-186.
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sumptions is very great. It is not limited to law (where readers of -this journal will certainly recognize it) nor to political problems (where readers of
the UNESCO sympokium will likewise recognize it), but occurs in science
and mathematics as well. Until quite recently, mathematicians were far from
clear as to the conditions they were assuming in talking about the "inside" and
"outside" of a closed figure in a plane. There can be no advance in clarification of concepts and issues until more effort is taken to analyze and state
all the presuppositions of a given position.
A second suggestion toward clarification of discussion, both between
contributors to such symposia as this and between readers, is the need for
closer attention to the difference between ideal and fact. In its final analysis,
the UNESCO committee points out the temptation to defend our own ideals,
while at the same time criticizing our opponents because of the shortcomings
of their actual practices. 4 By doing this, each party to an argument can in
turn convince himself of his superiority over his opponent; and unless the
cycle is somehow interrupted, there is no limit to the length to which such a
crossed monologu6 might be carried. If we are going to appeal to actual fact
to show the weakness of an opponent, 'the same appeal to fact is the only
legitimate ground on which to defend our own superiority. If we base our
case on a statement of our high ideals, this is conclusive only when we can
show these are superior to the ideals of an opponent.
Both factors mentioned-lack of clarification and crossing of modality
between ideal and actual-operate to produce the sharpening of the apparent
disagreement between the groups roughly identified above as contributors
proposing essentially political and those proposing essentially economic definitions of "democracy," and it is in this context that the UNESCO committee's
comment was made. There remain contributors of a third group, who ground
their definitions of democracy in basic notions of morality, such as a Kantian
respect for law and for human dignity. For this group, lack of clarification
and crossing of modality operate in the opposite direction, the effect of which
is to hide rather than sharpen differences in alternative definitions. Probably
such basic moral principles as thinkers of this group propose would be accepted
as good by proponents of each of the other definitions of democracy; but with
the qualification that not much help with the specific question at hand can
come from equating what is "democratic" with what is "good." From this
point of view, all three groups share certain basic ideals, and the only problem
is to decide between or test the means each proposes. Since the ends are
ultimately the same, and since the efficacy of means can in theory be objectively tested, it appears that there could be no ground for hostility and conflict
between nations sincerely cooperating in a common inquiry and enterprise.
4. Appendix III, pp. 532-537.
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The difficulty here is that this statement of the case confuses an ideal with
an actual notion of "testing." Different designs of motors and refrigerators,
for example, can be tested objectively because there is detailed agreement on
standards of measure, and because there is a laboratory where models can be
operated under controlled conditions, one at a time. But the actual situation is
more like that of trying out rival models at the same time in a laboratory which
does not afford enough space and power to provide optimum conditions for
either, and with the static and vibration of each interfering with the other.5
Under those conditions, the most reasonable engineer may lose patience, believing that an appeal to performance would issue in his favor if only the
other-model would stop shaking the laboratory and using up so much of the
available power. The confusion of actual and ideal is therefore also operative
in an analysis of this third kind, where it leads to overlooking the actual incompatibility that obtains in fact.
At least as critical as the needs for clarification and for distinction of
ideal and actual, suggested above, is the need to test the abstractions used in
describing actual situations. One cannot tell from their logical coherence alone
how adequate sets of concepts are to the content of the concrete situations they
are used to describe. A. N. Whitehead has shown some of the consequences
of the concept of "simple location" in Western thought." The notion prevalent
from Descartes to the twentieth century was that reality is made up of isolated small "places," in which "things" are located. The notion of such isolation of "place" was a very high echelon abstraction, formed by attending
only to properties of separateness and insulation; the willingness to equate
this with the full content of the concrete led into a maze of problems. As
common sense came to interpret spatial metaphors in the light of this "separative" function of space, the "sensible" man could see a factory as nothing
other than the sum of its separate employees and machines, each isolated from
the others; he could see "knowledge" only as an aggregate of simply located,
neatly boxed "facts" which scholars memorized and counted.' Whitehead
called this acceptance of incomplete abstractions as identical with the full content of experience "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness." This danger is
a different complicating factor in discussion from a confusion of actual and
ideal; it appears as a distortion of what is actual, and is a danger whenever
habit or authority persuade one to accept inadequate abstractions as t6ols for
describing the concrete situation.
As a case in point, the Marxist contributors who are applying their
5. One extension of this analogy is to suppose the machines are designed so that each
can only function efficiently while there is interference from the other. This, of course,
is the line of thought that George Orwell follows in his novel, z984.
6. WHITEHEAD, ScIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD (1925). Particularly relevant

here are cc. III-V.

7. WHITEHEAD, op. cit. supra note 6, c. XIII.
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"science of society" give an impression of dogmatic rationalism to the Western reader. Their deductions from their key postulates and definitions as to
what our experience as members of a capitalist society should be run counter
to what this experience in fact is." Upon investigation, the reason for this
may prove to be that concepts devised to describe economic and business practice in the nineteenth century are temptations to commit fallacies of misplaced
concreteness in the twentieth. This suggestion is confirmed to some extent by
the interest of some American students of business in reformulating key concepts of selling and management in a manner which avoids identifying concrete
fact with "simple location." Such a reformulation is never undertaken lightly
in the business field, because a mistake may be very costly economically: But
in spite of that risk, the reformulation is being vigorously attempted, since
the traditional abstractions miss so much when they are applied to contemporary situation-description. The "separative," "individualistic" abstractions
that motivated Scrooge in his unregenerate days never did catch all they should
have of reality, and are very inadequate when we try to apply them to the
contemporary structure of American business and society.'
Although any observer with a sense of irony can find one or two examples of current American practice that do agree with deductions from
Marx's basic definitions and predictions, the basic concepts of a Marxist (or
any other) science of society should be carefully assessed in terms of adequacy
to the total range of current institutions and practices. One suspects that
many of the non-Marxist contributors are also thinking about "business" and
"capitalism" with the aid of inherited abstractions; probably some of the lack
of explicitness in their statements of the economic conditions necessary in
order for any society to function politically as a democracy may be traced to
the unsuitability of these notions for such a statement. In reconsidering the
adequacy of traditional notions to describe the actual state of affairs,
UNESCO might consider breaking the Itradition of keeping apart practitioners
8. For example, some of the statements that the capitalist "controlled press" suppresses all criticisms of capitalism seem very odd when they appear here in a book published by an American press and intended in part for American consumption.
9. For example, the traditional way of thinking of a failing small business as "simply
located" apart from the rest of society is not a realistic one. The economic loss involved
is not paid by the proprietor of the failing enterprise alone, but ultimately is borne by
the whole community. (The unrealistic character of this application of "simple location"
has been developed in an unpublished paper by Mr. Kendall, of the Staff of the Indiana
University School of Business.) Nor is it realistic to think of management as dealing
with "simply located" individual employees, apart from recognition of the fact that a
factory is basically a social situation in which the "employee" takes on certain interests
and attitudes from membership in the group. (The development of labor organizations
is of course one factor that requires a recognition of this by management. But Professor

Isaack, of the Indiana University School of Business, has shown in an unpublished paper

that there is a basic contradiction between all standard definitions of "management" and
the notion of the "simply located" employee.) See also note 11, infra.
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of business and those of philosophical "speculation," prevalent since the sixth
century B. C., and extending its list of experts somewhat further. To summarize this third suggestion, we might say that one task of
philosophy is not to permute rigid abstractions no longer adequate to concrete
conditions, but to change them.
The purpose of this review has been to suggest several points to which attention can profitably be directed as this symposium is continued. In each
case, these suggestions appear in some of the contributions themselves, but
in the light of the volume as a whole, deserve more underscoring than they
are given.
The first suggestion is that a more rigorous attempt be made to get explicit
statement of all of the conditions contained in the divergent definitions of
democracy.' 0
The second suggestion is that care be used to discriminate between statements about ideals and statements about present facts. If complete explicitness in definition is achieved, and the rule of not crossing modalities is observed, the first result will be discovery of a greater agreement*of ideals than
appears from the present symposium. The second result, in an attempt to
introduce clarity into discussion of the actual, will be an attempt to discover
some common and impartial ways to measure characteristics of social fact;
here the various agencies of the United Nations may be appealed to to suggest
nd apply impartial standards in the needed way.
The third suggestion for attention in further inquiry (which, like the two
preceding, is offered for consideration by the reader of this symposium.as
well as by the experts participating in it) is that the "description of social fact"
be undertaken circumspectly. Standards of measure are of no help alone, if
the abstractions that determine what and where we apply them are vitiated by
some critical incompleteness. We may need some new rectification of our
thinking about business, economics, and sociology, paralleling the revision of
the concept of "location" which Whitehead advocated for contemporary
philosophy. As a matter of fact, one excellent first step in this direction of
rectification would be to determine how far our present concepts presuppose
a common sense geared to "simple location," and whether alternative formulations based on other interpretations of "place" are not better intellectual tools
10. Professor McKeon's essay brings out very clearly the need and complexity of
doing justice to all relevant directions of such definition and explanation. This and some
of his other political writings would be a very suitable common starting-point for a second
round of discussion aiming at greater clarity, if they could persuade participants to follow
his example and consider political institutions, economic and cultural conditions, socially
entertained ideals, and operative revolutionary tensions and forces as four dimensions that
must be specified in a complete definition or explanation.
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for the work in view."" In this process of evaluating the adequacy of traditional abstractions, participation of experts might include specialists in fields
other than philosophy and political theory.
In any case, the reader will find this volume an incisive and challenging
one, and will recognize its publication as a practical step toward lessening some
of the tensions of the world in which the symposium has been carried on.
ROBERT S. BRUMBAUGIIt
GiFT TAXES. By J. K.
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951. Pp. xi, 175. $2.95.

WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT ESTATE AND

Lasser.*

This distillate goes half circle in reconstructing the skeleton of the estate
and gift tax law in readable non-technical language. The enthusiastic pub-,
lisher puffs the offering as a "must" for lawyers wherein is "all the essential
information required to understand every important aspect of the Federal
Estate and Federal Gift Tax." The more modest Mr. Lasser states that he
writes primarily for the layman-the taxpayer; he characterizes his effort
as an attempt at the "perfect chip shot to the green." Mr. Lasser's statement
is the more accurate. The author has neither evolved a universal panacea nor
run the gamut of the full-blown omelet which is our estate and gift tax law.
Certain inaccuracies and liberties are a by-product of this simplification. With
the exception of stock valuation, this book is not addressed to the important
issue of establishing values for the inventory of an estate. Concededly, the
work is not a penetrating analysis. It is primarily a client's book to stimulate
constructive thinking as to what the client should do with his property. But
this little volume is not without interest to the lawyer.
The prolific Mr. Lasser is an accountant who has enjoyed wide circulation of his tax writing. His forte is simplification for the taxpayer of the
complexities of contemporary tax law. In light of the friction in some jurisdictions between lawyers and accountants as to the professional qualifications
for practice in tax matters, an observation seems appropriate on Mr. Lasser's
conduct in the phase of the tax field most sacred to the lawyer. This is an
area in which the lawyer, above all others, should be preeminently qualified.
This reviewer, who has served in the camps of both professions, will not use
11. The converse of this suggestion that"simple location" may be a distorting feature
of our traditional Western concepts, is developed by Professor Pool in his essay, where
he suggests that current Soviet thinking has fallen into the "organismic fallacy," a fallacy
of misplaced concreteness that is created when abstractions attend exclusively to "diffuse"
as opposed to "simple" location. If the early Soviet conception of "capitalism" involved
extreme over-emphasis on simple location, it is easy to see why in its antithesis an
antithetic notion of place appears.
t Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Indiana University.
* Certified Public Accountant in N.Y., N.J., Cal., and Ill. Adjunct Professor, N.Y.
University; Chairman, Institute on Federal Taxation at N.Y.U.; Chairman, Institute on
Taxes at Pennsylvania State College.

